
Indeed, the weight of the M198 is similar to that of the 2A65 MSTA-B 152 mm, which the Ukrainians already use in large numbers. For example, since the Ukrainian military does not typically transport its artillery by helicopter or cargo aircraft, the higher weight of the M198 is not a major constraint. Transportability is valuable, though current circumstances in Ukraine mitigate that value. It weighs much less than the M198 and is shorter in travel configuration. In comparison, NATO forces in and around West Germany in 1989, at the end of the Cold War, deployed at least 2,400 heavy artillery pieces to defend a border of approximately 2,200 km with East Germany and Czechoslovakia.Īs an extreme example of artillery use during a war of attrition, the British Army massed 1,400 guns on a front of 14 miles (100 guns per mile, 62 per km) for the Somme offensive in July 2016.Īs can be seen from a comparison of the weapon characteristics, the M-777’s main advantage over the M198 is transportability.

If Ukraine has 1,600 pieces of artillery, of all kinds, this amount is not enough to cover a combined border of almost 2,500 km. While not all these borders have active hostilities, that could change at any time. Ukraine’s border with Belarus, a potential adversary, is another 1,100 km. The border with Russia along Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts (not occupied by Russia) is 500 km. The actively contested frontline along the south of Ukraine and extending to the Russian border in the Kharkiv region is approximately 850 kilometers (km). While available ammunition is short, the front is long. Those limits will increase over time as accessible inventories become exhausted. However, with Russia and China, the major producers, unavailable, there are severe limits on what can be provided. The United States has scoured the globe to buy Soviet-standard ammunition and has sent Ukraine 45,000 152 mm artillery rounds and 20,000 122 mm rounds. Shortages of Soviet-standard ammunition (122 mm and 152 mm) have progressively reduced the value of Soviet-era artillery. While this may seem like a lot, it is inadequate considering the shortage of Soviet-standard ammunition, the length of the front lines, and the size of the Ukrainian forces. Added to the 424-plus howitzers received from allies, Ukraine has a total of approximately 1,600 artillery pieces. Ukraine started the war with approximately 1,150 Soviet-era howitzers: 750 152 mm howitzers and 350 122 mm howitzers. In addition, Ukraine has received at least 72 105 mm howitzers―36 from the United States, 36 L119 howitzers from the United Kingdom, and a few older M101 howitzers (perhaps around five) from Lithuania.

(The exact number is likely a bit higher since some countries do not disclose their transfers.) In total, Ukraine has received approximately 300 pieces of towed and self-propelled 155 mm artillery. Other countries have sent small numbers from their own stocks.

The United States has transferred 142 M-777 155-millimeter (mm) towed howitzers to Ukraine. While weapons like High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Javelins have received most media attention, artillery has proven that it is still the “king of battle” by the intensity of its use. Stable front lines, increasingly effective kill chains, and reduced scope for air power have created an environment where ground firepower trumps maneuver, at least for the moment. As an example of such substitution, this commentary explores the case for providing older M198 howitzers now that excess inventories of the currently fielded M-777 howitzer are exhausted.Ī1: The war in Ukraine has become an artillery war. As stocks of the most modern systems decline, the United States sends other systems. Will the United States reach a point where it can no longer equip the Ukrainian resistance? Earlier CSIS commentaries argued that support could continue indefinitely but only by using a wide variety of approaches. As the United States ships more equipment to Ukraine, concerns arise about whether this level of support is sustainable.
